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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah

ORSON LEWIS, doing business as
LEWIS BROTHERS STAGES,
Plaintiff,
Case No. 7311

vs.
STATE TAX COMMISSION,
Defendant.

BRIEF OF DEFENDANT
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

The fundamental facts in this case are not in dispute
and plaintiff's Statement of Facts, as outlined in its
brief, is substantially correct and the material parts
thereof are adopted by the defendant for the purpose
of this case.
QUESTIONS INVOLVED

· '1. · As: pointed out by the plaintiff, the major is_sue
in this case is a judicial construction of Title 80, Chapter
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15, Section 4, Utah Code Annotated, 1943, which imposes
a tax equivalent to two per cent of the amount :paid "(1)
to common carriers * * * as defined by Section 76-2-1
Revised Statutes of Utah, 1933, * * * for all transportation * * * provided, that said tax shall not apply t-.1
* * * street railway fares * * *. ''
2. Whether the Tax Commission did in fact construe

the Kearns operation of Lewis Brothers Stages as being
within the ~esignated exemption.

3. If the court finds that such construction did in
fact exist, whether such construction of the statute is
correct.
We will discu_ss these three questions chronologically
as outlined by plaintiff in its brief under plaintiff's
Statement of Errors.
1. The exemption created by the Legislature was
intended cover situations such as the Kearns operation.

to

2. The exemption has --been previously liberally con. strued ·by the Utah Supreme Court and the State Tax

Commission.
3. The Kearns operation complies with the valid
tests now being applied by the State Tax Commission
as outlined in Exhibit A.
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REPLY TO PLAINTIFF'S ARGUMENT

I.
The exemption created by the Legislature was intended
to cover situations such as the Kearns operation.
In discussing this question raised· by !plaintiff, it is
subnlitted that the only question to be determined is
the proper definition of the ter1n ''street railway fares.''
Plaintiff cites portions of the Utah Supreme Court Case,
[Jtah Light and TTaction Company v. State T,ax Comn~ission of Utah, 92 Utah 404, 68 Pac. ~d 759, in support
of plaintiff's position that the exemption of "street rail'"ay fares'' was intended to cover situations', such as
the !(earns operation. Plain tiff has a;~pparen tly read the
la-\v as set forth in the Utah Light and Traction Company
case and makes the novel assertion· that ''the Kearns
operation was only an integral part of an emergency
street transportation system in ·and· about Salt Lake
City." (Plaintiff's Brief, P. 10) and further, "It must
hP recognized that it '\vas only an extension of a street
transportation service during a war 'emergency which
the traction company' lacked facilities'to make.'' (Plaintiff's Brief, ~- 11) Plaintiff cites no case, and indeed
it is believed none can .be found, to support such contention. There is no assertion, nor is there any evidence
in the record, which would indicate that Plaintiff's
l(Parns operation had anything at all to do with the
operation of the Salt Lake City Lines.
This court, in deciding the Utah Light and Traction
Company Case said
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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''Scrutiny of the, language of the statute leads
to the same result. ln Section 4 (b), the tax is
imposed as follows: ""*A tax equivalent to two (2)
per cent of 'the amount'- paid:·,~ (1} To' common
carriers,· ·e>r telephone· or- telegraph· corporations
as defined by Section 76-2~1 of the Revised
Statutes- of Utah, 1933,' _to which is added the
proviso that such tax is . . hot to ap·ply to 'street
·railway fares.' Turning to section 76-2-1, we find
· the definition:. of common carriers 'includes every
r_aprq~<:}. corjporation; st!eet railrqad corporation;
• * * engaged in the transportation 'of persons or,
.i
.·.' trroperty fot public service over regular routes
·! ·~, .... between points within thiS' state.' ·Subdivision 14.
. In the same s-ection, the term 'street railroad' is
~·'
. ,.qefined ~s ~nclud~g 'ev.~ry railway, and each and
every brancli or extension thereof, by "rhatsoever
~H·,
power operated, being mainly upon, along, above
or below any street, * * * within any city or town,'
etc. Subdivision 7. It would seem to _follow that
when the phrase, ~street railway fares,' was used
the legislative-intent was· ·that such language had
reference· tO: the ·fares· paid• on~: evety 'street rail:
way,· 'and each and every branch or extension
thereof,_ by whatsoever power operated.' 1 his
la.nguage negativ-es the idea of an intent-ion to
classify or discriminate against the users of
mot·orbuses or trolley co·aches ·and- to favor the
_: riders of street ca.rs pa·rt.icularly where, as in
-ptlai.ntiff's case, the street car lines, bus lines arnd
trolley route~ .are necess(JrY.-Pf!;rts of an integrated
street railway system .. '' (~talics supplied.)
H,.... .

•

'

1

and further :

...., •. ...<.

'

•

-

''The trolley coach and motorbus substitutions
in place of street cars on rails or as an extension
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

5
.r
i

of the rail system are ordinarily considered as
being within the scope of street rail,vay service
and systems or auxiliary thereto. City of
Columbia v. Tatum, 174 S. C. 366, 177 S. E. 541;
Russell v. Kentucky Utilities Co., 231 Ky. 820,
22 S. W. (2d) 289, 66 A. L. R. 1238; Anderson v.
Knoxville Power & Light Co., 16 Tenn. App. 259,
64 S. \V. (2d) 204."
.

It is not for counsel to suggest to this court what
interpretation should be placed Ujpon the quotations from
the Utah Light and Traction Comp~any case. However,
it would appear from a reading of the· entire case that
the Tax Commission erroneously required the Traction
Company to report trolley coach and motorbus fares
"Thile exempting fares paid by streetear riders within
the same integral street railway system. It is, therefore,
submitted that in order for a transportation system to
qualify under the exemption of ''street railway fares''
the motorbuses or trolley coaches operating within the
system must be an extension or branch of a street railway system.
This court in two other cases has considered what
constitutes a street railway. The first case decided was
[Jtah Rapid Transit Company v. Ogden City et al, 58
Pac. 2d 1, 89 Utah 54'6 (1936). In this case the plaintiff
sought a \vrit of prohibition prohibiting the defendant
city from purchasing and operating motorbuses as a
common carrier within the city of Ogden. Prior to that
time the ·plaintiff had been operating a street railway
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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within the limits of Og.den City and then began using
motorbuses in conne~tion therewith.- The sole question
in the case ·was whether or: not the city- had authority to
own and operate buses within the city for the purpose
of transporting passengers: The· statutes of Utah permitted the city to maintain and·· operate a streef rail"way.
The contention of the defendant was that the purpose
of such· grant of power to n1unicipalities to operate
street railways was to enable thern to furnish transportation over the streets and the means employed to that
end were largely_ in their discretion. The court clearly
held that the authority to op~erate a street railway does
~ot imply aut~ority to operate motorbuses. The court
said:

'' * * * but to say that the former means of
transportation (street railway) fairly includes
the latter (operation of motorbuses) is to extend
the imtport of the word ''railway'' far beyond its
Ir1eaning. ''
The court quoted from the case of Simoneau 'I.".
Pacific Electric Railroad Co., 159 Cal. 494, 115 Pac. 320.
323, wherein that court quoted from the case of Hannah
v. Metrop. St. R. Co.', 81 Mo. :App. '78, 79 as follows:
" 'A street railway' has been variously defined.
As the name indicates, the primary meaning of
'street railway', or 'street railroad' is one
constructed and operated on and along the streets
of· a city or town for the carriage of persons from
one point to another in such city or town or to
and from its suburbs."
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say·:'~··

The Utah Supreme Court \Yent on to

·I

I ~

I

r

"A street railway is such' rega-rdless· of· the
... mO-tive power used~··*,* *.While no particular motiv.e po"reri ~n,4 no Jlai:tiG"l~r lo~~~ion ,alo:p.g ,~he
street is an essential characteristic of a street
rail"'"ay, yet a way or road without rails is· not ·a,
railway or railroad. * :~~:: * No case has been ·called
to our attention and we .have been unable ..to find
a case in which a motorbus line not run q~ rail.s
has been held to be a street railway.''
. I~ fact, the Utah Court said the contrary was held
to be the case in., Woodward v. City. . of. Seattle,
.
- 140 W.a.sh
.
83, 248 P. 73, 75. In that case Seattle owned a street
railway. system. It acquired a b~s, and while operat~n_;g
the sam~ in connecti~n with .th_eir ~tr~~t. rai~way a pa~
seng~r was i!ljured by negligence o~ -~~e bus ~riv~F· An
action was _brought against the city and the court held
.
that notwithstanding the city had the authority to oper•,J
ate a street railway it was witho~t auth_ority to oper~te
motorbuses. In its decision the court said:
.

~-

.

;

"

-

.

. . -.

r

,

-

~

~

..

,

'

" -.-

-·

~

.

\...

'

....

-

~

I'

.,

"The power granted by statute is restricted
to railways; and to say that the term 'railways'
may be construed to include motorbuses and
motorbus routes is to say that the term also
includes all manner of transportation, including
that by water and air. It is common knowledge
that for many years street railway systems have
been operated without the operation of motorbuses in connection, and this is conclusive that
such operation is not indisrpensable. ''
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From the statement of the Supreme Court of the
-State of Utah in the above case and from the decisions
which it favorably quotes, there is little doubt that the
law in Utah must be considered to be that the ter1n
''street railway'' cannot include, at least ordinarily,
motorbus trans:portation or ·-any other form of transportation not ~un on rails, or at least a basic street
railway ·system which includes an extension or branches
on which trolley coaches or motorbus substitutions 1n
the place of streetcars on rails are ·being· utilized.
The second Utah ·case was Utah Light d!; Tractio,-~
Company v. Public Service Commission, 101 Ut. 99, 118
Pac. 2d 683. The salient facts pertinent to our problem
are that the ·plaintiff brought an- action for the revocation of the order of the defendant issuing a certificate
of conveniehce and necessity to·- the Airway Motor
Coach Lines as a common carrier between Salt Lake
City and ·-nine smaller communities· in the South end
of Salt- Lake> County.
One of the contentions made by the plaintiff was that
the Commission's order was contrary to law for the
reason that the statutes· required- the application for ~t
certificate of- convenience and necessity to show that
the applicant had received the require~ consent, franchise
_or permit of the proper county, city, municipal or other
-:public authority before he could secure a certificate of
-conveni~nce and necessity.- The plaintiff asserted that
Airway Motor. Coach Lines had no such franchise. For
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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that reason the issua.;nce of the cer~iftcate \w~s contrary
to .law. rrhe Supreme Court dealt ·with this .~.<?n.tention
by saying that a ~ity or municipal corporation_ had not
authority under the statutes of .t,heL st~te of, "{Jtah to
grant or require an automobile corporation to have a
local franchise to .eD:gag~ .in business, ~houg4 the statutes
·permit the1n to grant a franchi~e to a street railway
company. The court states in ve;ry clear~
lang'\lage:
'
...... :
.

...

''That ·an automobile corporation such as this
(Airway-Motor Coach Lines) is not a street railway was held in Utah Rapid Transit Co. v. Ogden,
· 89· Utah 546."
.

.

-

,. .

._.

. ,;.•. . ; ,. '

, I

For this and other reasons the orderJ of. - the
Public
;
Service Commissi~n ~as ~~-~irmed. _9~ns~qu~~~ly, ~t seems
clear that Lewis Brothers Stages cannot claim to be a
street ra~lway. In adqition to th.is, in :View· of t~e Utah
Rapid Transit Company ca~_e, it. wou~d.
see:q~._ almost
!
!\
\Yithout _que_stion that the ter~ street. r~i~~~y ~ay not
be extended to include motorbus lines though such lines
operate in e~sentially the same ·manner as a street
.•

. .

•

.

-

i

·

· ·

·

--

-· ,

. -

•\

~

·:

)"•

_.

1

..

..:. -· .-

,

r :-

· =.

~

_,-

i·

I

.

.,

~

',

•

!

I

'

.:

_j

!.

• • .!,. -

~ailway.
•;

.

.

~~

.

.

-

.

_.;

In considering what the characteristics · of a street
rail,vay consist of, the following brief -quotadons would
seem helpful:
.

"j

'

'

( 1) "The right to lay rails· in a· public street

is the distinguishing featu:r.e of a street railway.''
(Atlantic -City and S. R. !Co. v. State Board of
Assessors, 96 Atlantic 568, 571)
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(2) "Street railways ,are only such as are
authorized to occupy and use the streets of a city
or town under franchise from the munjcipality. ''
- .(Lewis V'. Omaha and C. B. 8. Ry. Co., Iowa, 138
N.W. 1092, 1094)

_,

(3) ''A street railway is intended merely for
local ·convenience and to facilitate travel fro1n
po.ilnt to v~oint within the munic.ipality, or suburban
district and immediately adjacent thereto."
( H.artzell v. Alton, Grante and St. Lowis Traction
Co., 104 N~E." 1080, 1081 263 Ill. 205)

~t·

1
,

( 4) '' The fundamental purpose of a street
railway is to accommo-date street trav-el, and not
to travel to or from points beyond the city's
· lines." ('City of Aurora v. Elgin, A. & S. Traction
Co., 81 N.E. 544; 547, 227 Ill. 485)
1

( 5) "Street railways are * * * to enable
inhabitants of municipalities to pass from one
· · portion: o,f' their territory to another and to stop
at frequent and convenient points according to
.the regulations of the company.'' (Sparks v.
Phila, and C. R. Co., 61 A. 881, ~82, 212 Pa. 105)

(6) "The tracks for a street rail,vay are
ordinarily laid to conform to street grades. Its

cars run at short intervals, stopping at street
crossings to take . on and let off passengers and
not freight .. '' (Hannah v. Metrop. St. R. Co., 81
Mo. A:pp. 78, 82, citing Williams v. City Elec. Ry.
Co., 41 F. 556)

.
I

! p·,

..

. (7) . "Further., distinction is made .in the case

of Hartzell v. Alton, Granite and St. Louis Tractions Co. previou~ly cited. Therein the courts
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state that the law makes a clear distinction between a street railroad and a railroad. A street
railroad is a railroad laid down on streets of a
town or city for purpose of ca-rry·ing passengers
from one point to another in the city or to and
fro nz its suburbs, but a railroad runs across country carrying both passengers rand freight and
takes on the character· of a co1nmercial railroad.
(Italics supplied.) These cases are amply supported by many others holding similarly.
The court in the Utah Light and Traction Company
rase and plaintiff in its brief on page 12 indicate that in
detern1ining this matter \\e must look not to the letter
of the statute, but rather to the intent of the Legislature.
The Inost that can be said with regard to the intention
of the Legislature is as Judge Wolfe pointed out in his
concurring opinion in the traction company case that
''the Legislature did use the term 'street railway' here
to mean street transportation system.'' We submit that
no broader interpretation should be given to street transportation system than is given in the traction company
f'ase and that, if a street transportation system is to
be exempt from the collection of sales tax on their fares,
there must be at least partial compliance with the definition of comn1on carrier as set forth in Title 76-2-:1,
ReYised Statutes of Utah, 1933.
To now ,question what the Legislature n1eant by
street railway fares is purely speculative and \Ve believe
that the best indication of what the Legislature intended
iR \Vhat the Legislature said. Counsel has cited no case
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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and we have been unable to find one single case in \vhich
the words ,,, street railway'' are construed to mean a bus
transportation system or ·any other type of transportation system except one which is operated on rails. To
hold that the plaintiff in this case is not subject to this
tax would be to entirely nullify the statute imposing
the tax on common carriers. If Lewis Brothers -StageH
be exe1npt from the sales tax, considering their mode of
operation, then we would submit that every transportation co1n·pany operating in the state of Utah is also
exempt ..
Several portions of the ~ecord should be specifically
consulted with regard to this question. r~rhe testimony
?f Mr. Hacking, Chairman of the Public Service Commission, with regard to the operations of Lewis BrotherR
St~ges indicate~ conclusively that Lewis Brothers Stages
had no authority to operate a transportation syste1n
vvhich could possibly be construed as ''street raih:ray. ''
(R. 32-42) This testimony indicates that the Le:'Tis
Brothers Stages could pick up ;passengers at any place
on the ·Out-bound trip but could not discharge on-~the
out-bound trip, and likewise the Lewis Brothers Stages
could pick up ·passengers on the in-bound trip but could
not discharge passengers along the route until reachin~
Salt Lake City.
--~

In response to question by counsel as to whether
Le\vis Brothers Stages had any certificate -of convenience
and necessity allowing them to pick up and discharge
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passengers 'Yi thin the n1etropoli tan area of Salt Lake
City, ~lr. Hacking ans"~ered: ''They have no such cer-·
tifieate: never have had to my knowledge.'' (R. 41) To
the san1e effect ~Ir. Orson Lewis testified on cross examination as follo,vs:

Q. "~Ir. Lewis, you testified you picked up
and let off passengers between your terminal,
Salt Lake and Kearns; where did you pick U[p the
passengers J?
A. "Any place on our route.

Q. ''And on your out-bound trip, where did
you let them off!
A. '' 33rd South.

.;•.

Q. "That is the first let off'

,.,

A. "Yes." (R. 62) .
We submit that, in view of this and other testimony,
Lewis Brothers Stages wholly fails to meet the fourth
test used by the C·ommission which provides '' ( 4) Frequency of stops to pick up and deposit passengers along
streets of a city and suburban areas." (Italics supplied.)
One other principle which we feel must be considered
in eonstr11ing this particplar section is that a_nnounced
by this court in the case of ~orville v. State.Tax Comu~ission, 98 Utah 170, 97 Pac. 2d 937, wherein the court
held "But, likewise, statutes exempting taxpayers from
.
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a general taxing statute are construed strictly against
those seeking to escape the tax burden.'' Stillrnan v.
Lynch, 56 Utah 540, 192 Pac. 272, 12 A. L. R. 552; Parker
v. Quinn, 23 Utah 332, 64 Pac. 961; In re Steehler' s
Estate, supra; 25 R.C.L. Sec. 309, at p. 1093.
As we view this case the plaintiff is clairning to he
exempt from a general taxing statute and it is our contention that the exemption of street railway fares is an
exemption from a general taxing statute and is to be
strictly construed against the plaintiff.
II.

The exemption has previously been liberally construed
by the Utah Supreme Court and the Utah State Tax Comntission.

This sect~on of plain tiff's brief urges u;pon the court
that there has been an administrative construction by the
Tax Commission which, in considering cases of this kind,
should exempt the Lewis Brothers Stages from the paynlent of this tax. We submit the fact to be that the
record will not sustain the position of the plaintiff; that
there has never been any administrative construction
of this particular exem'ption, i.e., ''street railway fares.''
True it is that the testimony of Mr. Shields (R. 48-53)
indicates that in representing the plaintiff at that time,
Mr. Shields had some discussion with rnembers of the
Tax Commission concerning the general problem of the
sales tax and the conduct of the Le,vis Brothers Kearns
operation. \Ve submit that, accepting l\1r. Shields'
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te~timony

at its face value, this does not establish an
administratiYe construction "~ith regard to the f)xemption herein inYolYed. Mr. Shield's testimony (R. 50)
indicates that ~lr. Bennion's i1npression of the !(earns
operation "Tas that it "'"as in the nature of a streetcar
business. :Jf r. Shields testified as follows :
"So I came up to the Capitol tpe next morning,
and I talked to Mr. Bennion, and it seems to me
he was in this room (indicating), right here in
a little room, as I remember, and I talked to him
about it, and he said: 'That is going to be just
an in-and-out business, if what they tell us is s·o.
There will be several thousand soldiers out there,
and the Government is opposed to a tax on them.
They claim it is in the nature of a street-car business, and everybody is trying, the Chamber of
Commerce here are trying to save the soldiers'
expenses wherever it can be· done, and make it as
comfortable for them as it can be,' and he said,
'I think you are perfectly alright.''

''re also :point out in this eonnection that the testi.:.
n1ony of Mr. J. Lambert Gibson (R. 25-32) and the testimony of ~Ir. Bennion (R. 42-45) indicates. that neither
of these t"vo commissioners have any present recollection
of having considered the matter of the exen1ption from
the sales tax of Lewis Brothers Stages. One of the great
difficulties "~hen considering the administrative construcstruction of the statute by an administrative body, part~cularly where such administrative construction rests
npon ''"erbal conversations, is that it cannot be ascertained \Yith any degree of certainty as to exactly what
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m~tters

the. allege<f. conyers~.tio;n~ c_on~a~n,ed .. This difficulty is part~cularly e~em,plifi~rd.. by th,e . te~_t_imOP:Y of
Mr. Leonard Amodt (R. 54-56). Mr. Amoqt. ~estified
having talked to Mr. Barney, one of the auditors of the
S~ate .Ta.x Comwi.~~iqn, E;tnd t~stified as follows:
_, !

~ ~ l t~.

j-_, \ ;

Q. "You remember at the instigation of this
Kearns line, Mr. Orson Lewis informed you that
you would have to compute the sales taxes on the
fares, but apparently you ·hadlsome doubt about
this, or wanted to make a further check, ~and you
called. Mr. Barney .whom you knew qpite well, as
he was an auditor of the Tax Commission at that
time~

A. ''Yes, t.ha t is right.

Q. ''In substance, in your conversation, did
he state that under the circumst~ances which you
outlined he doubted "\vhether the sales tax should,
be chatged by you; it "ras his impression that it
shouldn't be charged~
I

&

'

,·.·;

··l

A. '.' Tha~ wa.s·. 4is qpi:n:fq;n. . . , .[ ...;; .·. , .
.

.

Q. "Something to that' effect~ ·
A. ''Yes, that \Vas his opinion. ''
~1r:

Amodt further testified· on cross-examination of
counsel for the Tax Commission·as follows: (R. 55)

Q. ''Mr. Amodt, you say that Mr. Barney
told you that under the circumstances as outlined
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no sales tax applied. Do you recall what circumstances you outlined to him'
A. ''I called ]\tfr. B~arney· on the ·telephone,
on my phone one night, and eX'plained our operation to Kearns. -

Q. ''Do you recall what you

said~

Q. "Do you recall what you

said~

A. ''I explained the operation, saying 'We
are operating a bus. system similar to Salt Lake
City Lines.' There was no detail about it. As .long
as I called him, I didn't want it to go on record;
but I did call, and explained to him our operation.
(Italics added.)
Q. "You indicated to him it was similar to
Salt Lake City Lines~

A. ''Yes. I told him passengers were picked
up and let off at different points.''
It can be seen readily from this testimony that the
impression of the nature of the plaintiff's Kearns operation held both by the Tax Commission and by Mr. ~ewis'
auditor \\'"as that this operation was similar to the Salt
I.-lake City Lines as it was operating at that time.
We submit that the evidence in the record does not
Hustain any administrative construction at all which
\Vould exempt the plaintiff herein from the collection and
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payment of sales ta~ on its Ke~rns operations. Admittedly, there has been a misunderstanding \Vhich has an
a)pparent unfortunate result with regard t9.this particular taxpayer. However, mere hardship or misfortune
does not and in fact cannot excuse the payment of taxes.
Counsel for the plaintiff makes a somewhat lengthy
co1nparison 'vith the operations of Airway Motor Lines
and concludes, apparently from the testimony of Mr.
Gibson, that Airway Motor Lines paid no tax and, therefore, the plaintiff should pay no tax. Considering the
fact to be that Airway Motor Li~~s--p~id ~o tax, this in
itself cannot and does not excuse -this taxpayer from paying the tax. Plaintiff recognizes that an erroneous construction made by an administrative body- will not bt~
upheld and cites Hotel Utah v. Industrrial Commiss-ion,
107 Utah 24, 151 Pac. 2d 467, and E. C. Olse__n Con~pany
v. State Tax Commission, 109 Utah 563, 587, 168 Pac.
~2d

324. ,

', l

;H.-t:""

•

This court has considered the pro ble·m of administrative construction many times and that ·portion of the ~j.
C. Olsen case set forth in plaintiff's brief (P. 18) covers
the rule quite well. Before there can he an administrative
eonstruction of a statute or for that matter a judicial
construction, the statute must be of such a nature that 1t
is susceptible of construction. In this case we submit
that the exemption from the collection cf sales tax on
''street railvvay fares'' is not susceptible of construction
a.nd that the exemption means "\\rhat it says.
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Therefore, we conclude and assert the fact to be
that there is, in the first place, no sufficient evidence of
ad1ninistrative construction of this exemption and, secondly, if the court should determine that there has ·been
such administrative construction, that an interpretation
of the statute 'vhich would hold ·a motorbus operation
such as Le"yis Brothers Stages to be a ''street railway''
is out of harn1ony with the provision of the statute and
cannot be given \veight, particularly in view of the fact
that this is an exemption froni a' general taxing statute
and n1ust be strictly construed against the tax;p.ayer.
III.
The Kearns operation complies with the valid tests
no\v being applied by the Tax Commission as outlined in
Exhibit A.

This portion of plaintiff's brief is a· continuation
of ·plaintiff's argument that there is an administrative
construction of that portion of Title 80-15-4, . which
exempts ''street railway fares.'' A compliance by a
street transportation system of the tests set forth in
Exhibit A would, it is admitted, constitute a "street
rail\va.y. '' Plaintiff contends that only three of the. requirements can be sustained and that No. 3 and No. 5
are erroneous and that to require complete compliance
was error.
Requirement No. 5, which holds '' ( 5) Should operate
'under permit or t~~anchise from city or municipal corporation," contemplates a type of street transportation sysSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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tern which does in fact require a franchise fron1 Salt Lake
City Corporation. Plainti~.cites the case of Utah Light
and Traction Company v. Public Serv·ice Comrnission,
101 Utah 99, 110, 118 Pac. 2d 683, as holding ''they (franchis.es) are required only in cases in which it is sought
to impose upon the street a special burden which.cannot
he imposed generally, that is, to burden the street \vith
a special privilege which the public generally may not
likevvise P-nj oy. A business such. -as that of the Airway~
does not so burden the street. It uses the streets only
for the purpose of travel and transport and it is not
subject to franchise requirements.'' Plaintiff concludes
then that this requirement cannot be sustained where
motor carriers are concerned. (Plaintiff's brief, P. 18)
'Ve submit, however, that contrary to plaintiff's inter[pretation of this particular requirement that the inference is strong that motorbus operations such as the Lewis
Brothers Stages cannot and do not qualify as a ''street
raihvay. ''
Distinguishing feature No.3 "Use of fare boxes" it
is submitted is a valiq .test and, while not conclusive, is
one factor which is considered by the Commission in
determining vvhat constitutes a "street Railway" and
we submit, while it is not of too much importance, the
Commission found as a matter -of fact that the taxpayer
had no regular fare boxes. (Findings of Fact No. 4 - R.
69)
Of the three remaining requirements, plaintiff con-
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cedes that they are proper factors to be considered and
contends that the plaintiff's Kearns operation eoinplied
\rith these requiren1ents.
Test No. 4 ''frequency of Stops to ·pick up and deposit passengers along streets of city .and suburban
areas." The crux of this test, it is submitted, and plain- .
tiff's assertion that the Kearns ojperation meets such
te8t, is based upon plaintiff's . basic theory ·that the
I~ earns operation was an '' ext~nsion of street transportation service by an indep.enderit ·carrier''_ (Plaintiff
Brief - P. 18) or "the- Kearns operation was only an
integral part of an emergency street transportation system in and_ about Salt Lake_ Cit~<' (~lai.ntiff'~ Brief P. 10) The frequency of stop 'te~3t, it is 'submitted, 'requires that the passenger service offered by the transportation ~ystem is such that the inhabitant~ of a municipality can pass from one point wrthin the municipality to another and frequent sto;pjs must be made for the
purpose -of loading and discharging passengers. As
heretofore pointed out, the !plaintiff's -~earns operation
did not pick up and discharge passenge!s on its outgoing trip, nor did it pick up and discharge passengers
on its in-bound trip. The evidence in the record clearly
sho,vs that plaintiff's only authority and only m-ode of
operation '"as to pick up passengers on the way out of
Salt Lake City and to take these passengers to Kearns
or, conver~ely, to 'pick up passengers at Kearns and deposit said passengers at various points within Salt Lake
City. Plaintiff's operation did not meet the require-
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ment of frequency of stops to pick up and deposit passengers along the streets of Salt Lake City, or for that
matter the suburban area surroundi~g Salt Lake City.
The Findings of Fact No. 5 (R. 69) made by the Commission should he sustained.
Test No. 2 "Sale of tickets or passes· on cars and not
from termina.ls'' we submit was .only partially complied
\vith. Mr. Lewis, in his testimony (R. 63) testified that
the tickets were sold at terminals and also that tickets
were sold' on the buses. It is- submitted, in view of this
testimony, that plaintiff's Kearns operation con1plied
only :partially with such test, for the reason that they
did maintain a ticket terminal.
As to the remaining test as set forth in Exhibit 1.\
'' ( 1) street railway is intended for local convenience to
facilitate transportation of persons from point to point
w·ithin municipality or suburban districts,'' we contend
that, unless the court adopts plaintiff's theory that their
Kearns operation was an extension of a normal street
transportation system, the operation totally fails to
colllipJy with such test. The Kearns operation was intended to facilitate transportation of persons from Salt
Lake City to Kearns, Utah, and not \vithin the municipality or within the suburban district. True it is that a
minor ·portion of plaintiff's operation, conducted with
the acquiescence of the Public Service Commission and
its General Order No. 10, which applied to all carriers
both interstate and intrastate (R. 39), might be interSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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preted as a partial compliance with Test No. 1. However, it could as 'veil be applied to any intrastate carrier or to plaintiff's operations between Salt Lake City
and Tooele, Bingham, etc. Such nominal comp~liance, we
submit, does not establish a mode of operation on the
part of plaintiff's Kearns operation which could he interpreted as local transrportation from point to point
'Yithin a mlmicipality. Plaintiff did not and could not
operate within Salt Lake City.- l\ir. Hacking on cross
examination testified as follows: (R. 37-38)

Q. "Do you recall under the terms of that
certificate, could Lewis Brothers Stages p~ick up
passengers at their terminal in Salt Lake City,
and discharge them on the outbound trip- at, s·ay,
Fifth South?
A. "No.
r,

Q. ''Could they discharge them, or what was
their first discharge point on their out - going
route?
A. "Their discharge point on the written
certificate was Kearns, on the pick-up going out.

Q. "On the pick-up going out; they could
not discharge passengers until they got to Kearns?
A. ''That's right.

Q. On the return trip, they could pick them
up, I assume, anywhere within Kearns. Were
there other places that they could pic~ up'
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A. ''Well, no. Kearns was their origin ipoint
on their return trip, the only origin point.
Q. ''And they could discharge any place on
the inbound trip within Salt Lake City; is that
right?

A. ''That is right.''

CONCLUSION

In conclusion the defendant, State Tax Commission,
respectfully submits that, in view of the ·authorities cited
and arguments presented herein, this court should deny
plaintiff's claim that the fares collected were exempt as
being ''str-eet railway'' fares, pursuant to the provisions
of Title 80-15-4, Utah Code Annotated, 1943.
Defendant further submits that no administrative
construction has been established by the record -in this
case by reason of which it can be claimed that the plaintiff's fares were exempt, or if such administrative construction can be said to have been established, then the
conclusion must be, we submit, that such interpretation
was erroneous and cannot be given ~eight.
The plaintiff herein was not a ''street railway'' and
the fares collected were not ''street railway fares.''
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WHEREFORE, defendant prays that the decision
heretofore rendered in this matter be affirmed and judgment rendered accordingly.
Resp~ectfully

submitted,

G. HAL TAYLOR,

Attorney for Defendant
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